Università Roma Tre

The course examines how the theme of "personal" identity is elaborated by Spinoza, Locke, Hume and James. trangely, in the Spinotian "Ethics" two answers to this problem seem to be traceable: in the first, the identity of the individual would be determined by its essence and therefore conceivable in its singularity "sub specie aeternitatis", while in the second it is determined only in duration, in function of what Spinoza calls "constitutio", and which consists of the whole of perceptions, imaginations, memories and affections from which it is taken in its own history. If the first answer risks assimilating the individual, which for Spinoza is only a mode, to the permanent substance of becoming, the second has difficulty in giving an account of the continuity in the alteration. Perhaps it is from this dilemma that Locke, in his "Essay on the Human Understanding", in a silent dialogue with Spinoza, can call into question the temporal continuity of the self or person, proposing to anchor personal identity to consciousness and no longer to substance, and that Hume, radicalizing the Lockean position, in the "Treatise on Human Nature", may even come to question its unity in a given moment of time, to reduce the «self» to a series of perceptions that are distinct from each other and are seamless in time, and thus to conceive it as a «fiction» on the level of the theory of mind, while preserving its unity as the object of mere «feeling» for the purpose of its application in the moral sphere. While elaborating a theory of consciousness that refers to this empirical and skeptical tradition, in the "Principles of Psychology" James makes a critique of Hume’s position on the «Self» as «bundle of perceptions», arguing that in experience there is no original distinction between impressions. On the contrary, there is a continuity of the "flow of thought", based on a constant appropriation of previous contents. Through the examination of the theories of these classics of modern and contemporary thought the course aims to familiarize the student not only with the ambivalence, the shifts, the second thoughts that are the subject of the history of philosophy, but also to put into perspective some of the central questions of contemporary philosophical reflection.

Baruch Spinoza, Etica, Milan, Bompiani (passim).
John Locke, Saggio sull'intelletto umano, Rome-Bari, Laterza (Book I, Chap. 4, Sect. 5 and Book II, Chap. 27)
David Hume, Trattato sulla natura umana, with English text, Milan, Bompiani (Book I, Part IV, Sect. V-VI, Appendice, Books II and III, passim).
William James, Principi di psicologia, Milano, Principato (Chap. 6, 9, 10: in part).

The course examines how the theme of "personal" identity is elaborated by Spinoza, Locke, Hume and James. trangely, in the Spinotian "Ethics" two answers to this problem seem to be traceable: in the first, the identity of the individual would be determined by its essence and therefore conceivable in its singularity "sub specie aeternitatis", while in the second it is determined only in duration, in function of what Spinoza calls "constitutio", and which consists of the whole of perceptions, imaginations, memories and affections from which it is taken in its own history. If the first answer risks assimilating the individual, which for Spinoza is only a mode, to the permanent substance of becoming, the second has difficulty in giving an account of the continuity in the alteration. Perhaps it is from this dilemma that Locke, in his "Essay on the Human Intellect," in a silent dialogue with Spinoza, can call into question the temporal continuity of the self or person, proposing to anchor personal identity to consciousness and no longer to substance, and that Hume, radicalizing the Lockean position, in the "Treatise on Human Nature", may even come to question its unity in a given moment of time, to reduce the «self» to a series of perceptions that are distinct from each other and are seamless in time, and thus to conceive it as a «fiction» on the level of the theory of mind, while preserving its unity as the object of mere «feeling» for the purpose of its application in the moral sphere. While elaborating a theory of consciousness that refers to this empirical and skeptical tradition, in the "Principles of Psychology" James makes a critique of Hume’s position on the «Self» as «bundle of perceptions», arguing that in experience there is no original distinction between impressions. On the contrary, there is a continuity of the "flow of thought", based on a constant appropriation of previous contents. Through the examination of the theories of these classics of modern and contemporary thought the course aims to familiarize the student not only with the ambivalence, the shifts, the second thoughts that are the subject of the history of philosophy, but also to put into perspective some of the central questions of contemporary philosophical reflection.

Baruch Spinoza, Etica, Milan, Bompiani (passim)

John Locke, Saggio sull'intelletto umano, Rome-Bari, Laterza (Book I, Chap. 4, Sect. 5 and Book II, Chap. 27)

David Hume, Trattato sulla natura umana, with English text, Milan, Bompiani (Book I, Part IV, Sect. V-VI, Appendice, Books II and III, passim).

William James, Principi di psicologia, Milano, Principato (Chap. 6, 9, 10: in part)

The course examines how the theme of "personal" identity is elaborated by Spinoza, Locke, Hume and James. trangely, in the Spinotian "Ethics" two answers to this problem seem to be traceable: in the first, the identity of the individual would be determined by its essence and therefore conceivable in its singularity "sub specie aeternitatis", while in the second it is determined only in duration, in function of what Spinoza calls "constitutio", and which consists of the whole of perceptions, imaginations, memories and affections from which it is taken in its own history. If the first answer risks assimilating the individual, which for Spinoza is only a mode, to the permanent substance of becoming, the second has difficulty in giving an account of the continuity in the alteration. Perhaps it is from this dilemma that Locke, in his "Essay on the Human Intellect," in a silent dialogue with Spinoza, can call into question the temporal continuity of the self or person, proposing to anchor personal identity to consciousness and no longer to substance, and that Hume, radicalizing the Lockean position, in the "Treatise on Human Nature", may even come to question its unity in a given moment of time, to reduce the «self» to a series of perceptions that are distinct from each other and are seamless in time, and thus to conceive it as a «fiction» on the level of the theory of mind, while preserving its unity as the object of mere «feeling» for the purpose of its application in the moral sphere. While elaborating a theory of consciousness that refers to this empirical and skeptical tradition, in the "Principles of Psychology" James makes a critique of Hume’s position on the «Self» as «bundle of perceptions», arguing that in experience there is no original distinction between impressions. On the contrary, there is a continuity of the "flow of thought", based on a constant appropriation of previous contents. Through the examination of the theories of these classics of modern and contemporary thought the course aims to familiarize the student not only with the ambivalence, the shifts, the second thoughts that are the subject of the history of philosophy, but also to put into perspective some of the central questions of contemporary philosophical reflection.

Baruch Spinoza, Etica, Milan, Bompiani (passim)
John Locke, Saggio sull'intelletto umano, Rome-Bari, Laterza (Book I, Chap. 4, Sect. 5 and Book II, Chap. 27)
David Hume, Trattato sulla natura umana, with English text, Milan, Bompiani (Book I, Part IV, Sect. V-VI, Appendice, Books II and III, passim).
William James, Principi di psicologia, Milano, Principato (Chap. 6, 9, 10: in part)